Hi all, just joined Zpool and mining lyra2rev2. I was under the impression 3 coins being mined for this algo are vertcoin,monacoin and Verge. I constantly see my miner mining mobilecash with little payout.... can somebody explain why?
Cryptocurrency mining is a broad subject, with many different facets. There are a number of different ways in which mining can be done, ranging from traditional dedicated hardware mining, like the ASICs, GPU mining, cloud mining or web browser mining, to name some. However, a very interesting and less known concept is the one of merged mining. This process entails the mining of two coins that are based on the same algorithm, simultaneously. Basically, merged mining allows a miner to mine on more than one blockchain at a time. The added benefit to this is that the miner will contribute to both of the blockchain’s hashrates, hence increasing their security (lower threat of a 51% attack) and functionality. Satoshi Nakamoto himself has written on the subject, in this Bitcointalk post from 2010 regarding Bitcoin specifically, saying: I think it would be possible for BitDNS to be a completely separate network and separate block chain, yet share CPU power with Bitcoin. The only overlap is to make it so miners can search for proof-of-work for both networks simultaneously. The networks wouldn’t need any coordination. Miners would subscribe to both networks in parallel. They would scan SHA such that if they get a hit, they potentially solve both at once. A solution may be for just one of the networks if one network has a lower difficulty. I think an external miner could call getwork on both programs and combine the work. Maybe call Bitcoin, get work from it, hand it to BitDNS getwork to combine into a combined work. Instead of fragmentation, networks share and augment each other’s total CPU power. This would solve the problem that if there are multiple networks, they are a danger to each other if the available CPU power gangs up on one. Instead, all networks in the world would share combined CPU power, increasing the total strength. It would make it easier for small networks to get started by tapping into a ready base of miners. Perhaps the most discussed examples of merged mining are the pairs Bitcoin & Namecoin and Litecoin & Dogecoin. In a merged mining process, there always has to be a parent blockchain and an auxiliary one. This process does not require any additional computing power from the miners, which is a big advantage. First, a block of transactions for each chain has to be assembled. The next step is simply starting to mine. During the process there are 3 possible outcomes:
Mining a block at Bitcoin’s difficulty level. You receive both mining rewards.
Mining a block at Namecoin’s difficulty level. You only receive the Namecoin mining reward.
Mining a block between Namecoin’s and Bitcoin’s difficulty level. Same outcome as scenario number two.
The biggest disadvantage of implementing merged mining is that within the auxiliary chain, there is implementation and development work involved and when switching, a hard fork is needed. Overall, merged mining benefits miners, not so much investors, however it does offer other perks like increased security for the actual networks. Could be the perfect approach for new projects, in terms of protecting themselves from a 51% attack for example. It is an interesting implementation which more people should be aware of.
This is Charlie Lee, creator of Litecoin. I've got asked many times to do an AMA for merged mining. This is a bit time consuming for me, but I'm interested in merged mining academically. And maybe this will be helpful to people. I will come back later to answer all questions. And then maybe replace this post with a FAQ. Please keep questions to Litecoin, Dogecoin, and Merged Mining. Everyone, please don't answer any questions unless you are sure you know the answer. I want this to clear up any confusion and not to create more confusion. Thanks! P.S. Here's a good technical explanation of merged mining: http://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/273/how-does-merged-mining-work And namecoin's info: http://dot-bit.org/Merged_Mining P.P.S. Also open to questions about other ways (other than merged-mining) to this problem.
Charlie Lee's (aka coblee) final thoughts on Merged Mining
I'm glad to see that my post has got the community talking. This is what I wanted to do. Sorry for trying to scare you guys into action. Most shibes do not realize how bad the situation is and will become. I was around when Namecoin went through the rollercoaster difficulty problem and had to merged mine in 2011. I've mined Namecoin and I have also mined Namecoin merged mined with Bitcoin. I created Litecoin and spent 3 years working on it seeing it go from a CPU coin to a GPU coin and now a ASIC coin. I've seen many coins get attacked for lulz. So there are only a few people that truly understands the situation you are in as well as I do. Most of them are happy to sit back and make popcorn. But, I felt responsible for doing something (anything) to try to help. The first time I approached you guys, I thought it was win/win for Dogecoin and Litecoin. Today, it's pretty much only to help Dogecoin survive. I own some Doge, not a trivial amount but also not a huge amount. So I won't lose sleep over it if it goes to 0, but I am definitely not doing this to protect my investment. And I don't make posts to try to manipulate the market. You may not have liked the way I presented the facts in my post. Some think it's FUD. Maybe I did do a little of that to scare people to action. But whatever the case, at least it's working. Some of you hate me. Some of you think that I'm an egotistical maniac that just came here to gloat and say I told you so. Whatever. I'm too thick-skinned to let this bother me. I do what I feel is right. All I know is that I will hate to live with the fact that I knowingly let dogecoin get attacked when I could have done something about it. Maybe it's because if Litecoin is my child, Dogecoin is my grandchild (or is it my child's dog?) The community and good will you have built in such a short time is admirable. I would hate to see it get destroyed by someone doing it for lulz. And if Dogecoin does get attacked, it will be bad for all of crypto-currency. Dogecoin introduced a lot of new people to crypto-currency. These people will be hurt the most. And that's bad for everyone. I still see a lot of confusion about merged mining, and I would like to clarify as much as I can:
This is not an offer from me or Litecoin. I am just proposing a solution. You can do whatever you want and I can't stop you.
If you do decide to merged mine, TheMage and I (and others) will do whatever we can to convince pools to merged mine.
Merged mining will fix your hashrate problem so that you would never to worry about hashrate and can concentrate on what's more important.
Merged mining does not merge our community, our devs, or anything for that matter. Litecoin users hate that just as much as you guys hate it.
Merged mining is not the only viable option. You should explore all the options and decide what's best for Dogecoin.
I truly believe something needs to be done now. You do not have much more time to wait.
Lastly, no solution will please everyone. So the dev team will need to make a decision after weighing everything. But inaction is the worst decision.
And if you have questions about how merged mining works, please read my whole merged mining AMA again. It answers all your questions about why merged mining does not hurt dogecoin price. And why merged mining is really the best solution to this unique problem. I will be around to answer any questions. (But please read the AMA first) And I am at the Chicago Bitcoin conference today and will be at CoinCongress in San Francisco on Wednesday/Thursday. If anyone wants to approach me to talk in person, I will be glad to. I don't bite... really, I don't. :) *EDIT: I tipped the top posts each 1000 doge until I ran out of coins. I got most of these coins as thanks when I did the AMA. Figure I should pass these back to people who are contributing to this conversation. Thanks! *
Merged mining makes absolutely no sense in the context of this fork
Hello all, I've been reading a lot of posts around here about making the scalable(s) fork(s) merged mining compatible. I don't know where people got this idea from, but really, this makes no sense. First, a merged mined coin is dependent on the "original" chain from where miners can merge mine. For example, Namecoin is dependent on Bitcoin. One has to mine Bitcoin in order to mine Namecoin. Why would you want our scalable Bitcoin to be dependent on the perpetual existence of BlockstreamCoin? We should be abe to keep going even if they disappear. Secondly, and probably most important, a merged mined coin is extremely vulnerable to attacks from miners of its parent coin. Just read about CoiledCoin and how LukeJr killed it so easily. He had no extra cost, didn't need to stop mining Bitcoin at all, and could perform a >50% attack that froze the network at its inception. Same thing would easily happen with our spin-off if it was merged mining. PS: I base my post on the knowledge I have of merged mining obtained after reading about it shortly after Namecoin was launched. Perhaps that's outdated and today merged mining can be done without the issues I describe, in which case I'd appreciate to learn more.
Abstract Merged mining refers to the concept of mining more than one cryptocurrency without necessitating additional proof-of-work effort. Merged mining was introduced in 2011 as a boostrapping mechanism for new cryptocurrencies and countermeasures against the fragmentation of mining power across competing systems. Although merged mining has already been adopted by a number of cryptocurrencies, to this date little is known about the effects and implications. In this thesis, we shed light on this topic area by performing a comprehensive analysis of merged mining in practice. As part of this analysis, we present a block attribution scheme for mining pools to assist in the evaluation of mining centralization. Our findings disclose that mining pools in merge-mined cryptocurrencies have operated at the edge of, and even beyond, the security guarantees offered by the underlying Nakamoto consensus for extended periods. 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Abstract So far, the topic of merged mining has mainly been considered in a security context, covering issues such as mining power centralization or crosschain attack scenarios. In this work we show that key information for determining blockchain metrics such as the fork rate can be recovered through data extracted from merge mined cryptocurrencies. Specifically, we reconstruct a long-ranging view of forks and stale blocks in Bitcoin from its merge mined child chains, and compare our results to previous findings that were derived from live measurements. Thereby, we show that live monitoring alone is not sufficient to capture a large majority of these events, as we are able to identify a non-negligible portion of stale blocks that were previously unaccounted for. Their authenticity is ensured by cryptographic evidence regarding both, their position in the respective blockchain, as well as the Proof-of-Work difficulty. Furthermore, by applying this new technique to Litecoin and its child cryptocur rencies, we are able to provide the first extensive view and lower bound on the stale block and fork rate in the Litecoin network. Finally, we outline that a recovery of other important metrics and blockchain characteristics through merged mining may also be possible. References
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Abstract Merged mining refers to the concept of mining more than one cryptocurrency without necessitating additional proof-of-work effort. Although merged mining has been adopted by a number of cryptocurrencies already, to this date little is known about the effects and implications. We shed light on this topic area by performing a comprehensive analysis of merged mining in practice. As part of this analysis, we present a block attribution scheme for mining pools to assist in the evaluation of mining centralization. Our findings disclose that mining pools in merge-mined cryptocurrencies have operated at the edge of, and even beyond, the security guarantees offered by the underlying Nakamoto consensus for extended periods. We discuss the implications and security considerations for these cryptocurrencies and the mining ecosystem as a whole, and link our findings to the intended effects of merged mining. References
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Abstract The term near or weak blocks describes Bitcoin blocks whose PoW does not meet the required target difficulty to be considered valid under the regular consensus rules of the protocol. Near blocks are generally associated with protocol improvement proposals striving towards shorter transaction confirmation times. Existing proposals assume miners will act rationally based solely on intrinsic incentives arising from the adoption of these changes, such as earlier detection of blockchain forks. In this paper we present Flux, a protocol extension for proof-of-work blockchains that leverages on near blocks, a new block reward distribution mechanism, and an improved branch selection policy to incentivize honest participation of miners. Our protocol reduces mining variance, improves the responsiveness of the underlying blockchain in terms of transaction processing, and can be deployed without conflicting modifications to the underlying base protocol as a velvet fork. 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Hello, I feel like I had to make a post about it. I read too many BS everywhere from people who have no understanding in how this would work. So this post is an attempt to explain what was meant by merged mining. First: MERGED MINING != LITECOIN/DOGECOIN BECOMING ONE COIN. Ok, now read it one more time: MERGED MINING IS NOT A CURRENCY MERGE. Okay, now let's dive a bit more into specifics. What is merged mining, what does it mean, and who would be impacted. Merged mining already exists in the cryptocurrencies world. For example, Namecoin supports merged mining with Bitcoin. You can verify it for yourself, Bitcoin and Namecoin both still have their blockchain, and they're both different currencies. Merged mining is the process of mining two (potentially more) currencies at once. If LTC and DOGE were merged mining, that means that the hashrate of BOTH network would be current_hashrate(DOGE) + current_hashrate(LTC). It helps secure the network by giving it a higher hashrate. So, how is it possible to mine two currencies at once ? What is required to do so ? First, this require writing some code to support this. In the Namecoin/Bitcoin case, Namecoin implemented the code to support merged mining with Bitcoin. Bitcoin didn't change anything. Basically, that means that the Namecoin network considers a Bitcoin PoW a valid PoW for itself (provided that the difficulty matches). If you want more technical details, I suggest you read this post: http://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/273/how-does-merged-mining-work Only miners would be impacted by such merged mining, as it doesn't change anything else in how things work (for end users). One of downside is that the blockchain of both (but mainly the blockchain of the currency that supports merged mining) would be a bit bloated by block hash / tx hash from the other network. I hope this post will help people gains a better understanding at merged mining. If you feel like reading a more in depth explanation, please read the StackExchange link as their explanations are very good. PS: This post doesn't advocate for merged mining LTC/DOGE. It's not against it either. It's just an explanation.
I know I'm probably going to get torn apart for this, and I really don't want to, but, I feel it's worth saying. I've been a shibe for a while. Pretty much almost nearly as long as 'a while can be' without being there on day one. There's been a lot of suspicion lately of folks but, really, about a month back, I stopped posting, and took to just reading because everything got way too heated in here - and for a lot of reasons, the heat was just too hot, so I got out of the kitchen. Anyhow. Here it goes. /coblee seems to at least be approachable. Why couldn't we try a temporary trial run of merge mining with LTC? Barks and howls, I know... But I think it's because a lot of people are more afraid of what 'might' or what they don't know, versus what would really happen. In a really short summary for those who are new and not in the know: Merged mining does NOT mean that Dogecoin would merge with Litecoin. It would simply mean that when you mine at a certain pool (YOUR CHOICE) - you'd get both LTC and Doge. A lot of people say "No!" because of pride. Right now it's not just Dogecoin having trouble but EVERY altcoin. It's not putting your tail between your legs for two altcoins to ally. When things get bad, sometimes allegiances are the best defenses. Power in numbers, and all. Others say "No!" because they feel it would couple Dogecoin's value to Litecoin forever. That's really just conjecture, though. Remember every miner has a choice as to whether or not to merge mine; not every pool would support it or choose to support it. It isn't a mandatory thing. We're merge-mining right now with Tacocoin, and nobody really even notices. I understand that Tacocoin of course doesn't have as much sway out there as LTC, but it hasn't really had a profound effect on either coin, except for helping Taco's hashrate some. (Generally the lower-rate coin gets helped.) Back in the day, Bitcoin merge mined with Namecoin. It didn't destroy namecoin (even though namecoin's premise and purpose - domain registration and an alternate DNS system - didn't really take off.) in fact it seemed to help it somewhat. With where Doge's value is (I don't believe it'll be here forever) - now would maybe be a time to swallow SOME pride (not all) and ask if LTC would be willing to let us do it on, say, a 1 month trial basis, with plans to discontinue and analyze, after that month is up? (It is discontinuable, as nobody really merge mines NMC with BTC anymore.) I just don't see how that would hurt. Non-permanent and non-destructive, and every single miner gets to choose whether or not to do it. Nobody would be forced to do anything. Then we'd have a little data to see what went on. Please, understand, this is not an admonishment or any kind of vote of non-confidence, it's just an idea that it may be a good time to try an experiment that really should not harm Dogecoin, and hoping to open some people to considering some new paths. We don't have to take them, but I think this would be a way to test it and see how we come out.
I'll give 1000 Doge to someone who writes an understandable and in-depth explanation of merged mining.
It's a pretty hot topic right now and many people are scared by the idea of merged mining, but I noticed people don't really understand what it is for the most part. So hopefully someone who understands this stuff can write a good explanation that we can all understand. At least than we can make in informed decision. The most important thing is that it's not merging our coins. Here's how I understand it now; What you do when you look for a block is solving a complicated equation with a random input number, and then checking if the result (the "hash") is the right one to find the block. Us and Litecoin both use the same algorithm to mine our coins. This means we're both doing the same kind of calculations to find hashes. The idea of merged mining is basically that we pool all of these hashes, and check not only if they found a Doge block, but if they found a doge or a litecoin block. This would mean that all of the miners that our coins are now competing for can work on both networks simultaneously, our network would get a lot bigger and more stable while we still keep our own separate networks. edit: I got linked this which is pretty useful info on namecoin merged mining;
"Merged mining works like this, you have two totally separate block chains, they are not related in any way nor does either contain any data from the other. When you mine you generate hashes that may be the solution to the current block, this is very very improbable per hash, its like a lottery where everyone generates tickets until someone finds the winning one. Normally you make tickets and check them against the Bitcoin block chain to see if they are the solution. With merged mining you create a ticket and check it against both the Bitcoin block chain and the Namecoin block chain, Bitcoin and Namecoin know nothing about each other, they are two totally different lotteries with different winning numbers, you just sent a copy of your ticket to both. Since you are sending the same ticket to two lotteries you increase your chances of winning one or the other. No Bitcoin data goes into Namecoin no Namecoin data into Bitcoin they remain totally separate, you simply run both the Namecoin and Bitcoin clients on the same machine and submit hashes to both networks, if your hash is the solution to the Namecoin block you get Namecoins if you hash is the solution to the Bitcoin block you get Bitcoins, its exactly like if you where mining on just one network, except you submit the same work twice."
Charles Lee, the creator of Litecoin, MIT graduate, Google employee, Coinbase employee, came here with a friendly offer. What is this? 1) It would be huge news and good for both coins imho. 2) We would very simply guarantee the future of DOGE forever and ever without "tapering" or other dangerous schemes. Please lets not let Litecoin and Dogecoin egos prevent doing the right thing for us. Lets just merge mine DOGEcoin with Litecoin, and watch the price skyrocket because the uncertainty about Doges future would be removed instantly! We all complain that the government cannot work together to get things done for the good of everyone - lets rise above that petty mentality. Instead of complex schemes that may fail like "tapering" get together with Charlie Lee and lets merge! All problems solved overnight! DOGE safely goes to the moon! This Shibe can feel time might be running out, and doesn't want to see our awesome community destroyed by a 51% attack. If you don't understand - please have a look - http://www.coindesk.com/what-dogecoin-must-do-survive/ "Merge mine. Namecoin was (and is) an independent block chain, but since block 19,200 about 80-85% of its network hashrate (and block rewards) are tied to bitcoin mining pools through a process called “merged mining.” The new sidechains project from Blockstream is attempting the same process. Charlie Lee, creator of litecoin explained how dogecoin could be “merged mined” with litecoin in a series of posts last month."
[uncensored-r/Bitcoin] Forks are so natural. Open your mind and have an unbiased look.
The following post by igenno is being replicated because the post has been silently greylisted(for 4.2 hours). (It was approved by the mods at: 2017-10-24T18:40:04.000Z) The original post can be found(in censored form) at this link: np.reddit.com/ Bitcoin/comments/78d26e The original post's content was as follows:
Ever seen a tree without branches? If no, proceed with me, I will not speak about so called malicious forks here, I promise.
Fork (computer science) An event where development of some free software or open-source software is split into two or more separate projects.
We (humans) always try to describe new concepts using terminology from the widespread ones. When software development became a thing, forks and branches and trees started to be everywhere. Being a software, Bitcoin is not exclusion. The only difference is that Bitcoin is a special software. One so innovative that it gave birth to the whole new concept. And soon terminology got messy, distorting perception of innovation. Namecoin is a fork of Bitcoin (the first fork, to be precise) and it is a great fork. Rise your hand one who does not want decentralised domain name system. And Litecoin was afterwords. Started 'for fun' it's now a third largest crypto-currency (excluding bullshit). And do you know why? Cause the idea behind is good, quite good. 'The universe wants one money', of 'one to rule them all', or anything else? Bitcoin alone will not serve the needs of everyone (LN is for 500mln people opening two channels per year not considering segwit capacity increase – good but not enough, not even close). 'We will increase the capacity one day' – sure we can, but do we really need to sacrifice a privacy of the main system? Here is the recipe of a super friendly Bitcoin fork:
Shares the whole history with Bitcoin
Has sha256 mining algorithm and implements Merged Mining (can be mined simultaneously with Bitcoin)
Has the same number of coins
Has strong two-way replay protection
Uses different (and not used by alts) version byte for address encoding
Now lets look what we can do with such forks. First, lets make a BitNameCoin. That's basically the same Namecoin, only you have coins in it, the market cap is 100x of current, more miners mining it, more people know about it, the decentralised DNS is here to stay. Then, let's make BitLiteCoin. That's Litecoin without scrypt, with 21mln coins instead of 84mln. Block generation time is 2.5 minutes, meaning that it has 4x capacity of Bitcoin (while blocksize/weight is the same). And don't forget, you have coins from the beginning, you are early investor. And let's not forget about BitEthereumCoin. Ethereum without enormous premine. Period. Sidechains? Two-way peg sidechains are likely years away. Federated sidechains are bullshit, as well as drivechains. The forks described above would have more than 80% of coins distributed in exactly the same way as in Bitcoin (and Bitcoin has the fairest coin distribution out there). With atomic swaps and interoperable lightning networks those forks would be tied so tightly, we will be treating them as one tree. One flourishing tree with many-many branches. Don't take this too serious anyway. I did not want to hurt anyone. Thanks for reading. P.S. (and edit) and money will flow back into Bitcoin from alts. Cause, you know, free money, huh.
How do you think of making Mooncoin a merged mining coin?
Merged mining coin such as Namecoin merged mining while mining Bitcoins, might save Mooncoin from the ASIC disaster which is comming soon. If we are not chaning Mooncoin's algo, how about chaning Mooncoin as the first merged minined Scrypt coin for Litecoin or Dogecoin? How do you think of it?
Has NameCoin been branched, or merged into another branch?
Has the NameCoin feature set (the ability to store key/value pairs in a block chain) been branched, or merged into any other block chains? Specifically, I'm interested in adding NameCoin like features to DefCoin (just a branch of LiteCoin made for DefCon), an otherwise crapcoin, but a natural choice for a project I'm working on. From my limited understanding, I would have to branch the DefCoin block chain (or just start a new one) for DefName (for lack of a better name). Consequently, I'd also want to bring over the Merged Mining features of NameCoin so that one could mine for DefCoin and DefName at the same time. Hopefully, an update to the DefCoin client would include both, so as miners upgraded they'd automatically start mining DefNames too, and for "free." I'm not an SDE, but I can hack my way through C/C++ code. Nor am I a mathamatician, but I understand crypto in more detail than most nerds. I have not sunk my teeth into any of the crypto-currency code bases (bitcoin, defcoin or namecoin), so I'm mostly speaking from ignorance. How crazy is my idea? Just how much crack am I smoking? If not much, does anyone have any pointers on where to start? Or better yet, does this sound interesting to anyone else who's actually qualified? If someone were to merge this into LiteCoin (actually used!) I could pretty easily port that into DefCoin.
I'm working on enabling merge mining for the Prohashing mining pool. I've spent 45 hours trying to get the dogecoin daemon to accept a merge mined block, with no success. I'm posting my progress in this post, in the hopes that someone who has experience in merge mining can figure out what is wrong. I'll tip the first person $50 in DOGE (about 180,000 DOGE at current rates) who can tell me what is wrong with what I'm doing. If there are multiple issues, then I'll split the reward amongst all the helpers. I simplified the procedure by removing the parts of the algorithm that are irrelevant. Here is the procedure I used:
Get the latest block from the litecoin testnet and store its data in memory.
Call getauxblock against the dogecoin testnet. Since this example is only going to merge mine dogecoins, we ignore "chainid" and store only "hash" in memory. "Target" is obtained by calling getblocktemplate, because we need difficulty and other things from the full template for calculating payouts. "Target" in getauxblock and in getblocktemplate are reversed, so the appropriate conversion is made.
When a block is found for the litecoin testnet, check to see whether the target is less than the dogecoin testnet's target. If so, we call getauxblock again, passing the "hash" exactly as provided in step 2, without any modification, and the serialized block data as the second parameter. The help for the command states that the parameters are "getauxblock [hash] [auxpow]."
The result is that the litecoin blocks are always accepted, and the dogecoin blocks are always rejected with the following errors:
2014-10-09 02:37:45 ERROR: Aux POW merkle root incorrect 2014-10-09 02:37:45 ERROR: AUX POW is not valid
Here is an example "auxpow" serialized block that is submitted to the dogecoin damon. I annotated it as I think is correct, but keep in mind that the annotations could be incorrect and you shouldn't assume that I have identified the correct things to insert or the correct order. In the real submission, there are no spaces or characters between the separated sections. Litecoin coinbase transaction:
The length of the merkle branch from the litecoin block, which is the same as the branch sent out in the stratum protocol. Because this litecoin block has no transactions, the length of the merkle branch is zero:
The litecoin merkle branch, if there were one, would go here in a series of hashes. Since there are no transactions in the block other than the coinbase transaction, we append nothing here.
[There is nothing here]
The "branch side mask" of the coinbase transaction, which is always zeroes:
The auxiliary branch count, which is zero because we are only mining dogecoins in this example:
The auxiliary branch index, which is also zero because we are only mining dogecoins:
I'll also break down my understanding of what is supposed to be placed in the litecoin coinbase transaction to signify that we are merge mining dogecoins. Here is my understanding of the litecoin coinbase transaction's merge mining portion, which you can find embedded within the coinbase transaction printed above: This string signifies that we are merge mining.
The "hash" parameter obtained from the dogecoin daemon's getauxblock command, verbatim:
The following are used for when multiple merge-mined coins are being sought at the same time, but since we are only merge-mining dogecoins, this is a 4-byte 1 followed by a 4-byte 0.
Here are some of the things I tried and the references I used.
https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Merged_mining_specification seems to be the primary source on merge mining. However, I noticed that some of the examples in the document don't work with dogecoins. For example, the "block hash" in the auxiliary proof of work that is submitted to namecoin in that document (the second field) looks like the proof of work hash for the block, since it ends in a string of zeroes. Looking at that, I tried placing the scrypt proof of work hash in that field, but it didn't work.
My understanding of the "block hash" is that when you call getblock from a daemon, you provide the double SHA-256 hash of the block header, not the scrypt proof of work hash. The "block hash" is not the scrypt proof of work hash.
I tried reversing various hashes in the fields of the blocks on the theory that endianness was the problem, but 16 different permutations didn't work. I tried reversing the dogecoin auxiliary hash, the block hash, the merkle branch hashes (when there are transactions in the litecoin block, which there are not in this example), and even the block header of the litecoin block. None of these things worked. I couldn't find a permutation of reversed and non-reversed hashes that made any difference. Of course, it is possible that, since there are so many permutations, that I missed the correct one and the hashes are not in the correct endianness in the example.
At http://forum.namecoin.info/viewtopic.php?f=7&t=368, there is a poster who offers advice on how to submit merge mined blocks to getauxblock, although that information is specific to namecoin. I reviewed what I was doing and it appears to be identical to what he is suggesting.
After reviewing the documentation for what a merkle tree is, it took me an entire day to figure out what happens when there are an odd number of transactions in the tree. It turns out that the algorithm is to hash the nodes with themselves. Seeing this, I took the example above and I tried specifying the length of the "merkle branch" for the coinbase transaction as "01," and then provided the hash of the coinbase transaction as the only hash in the "merkle branch." The long-shot idea was that perhaps the dogecoin daemon was looking to hash the coinbase transaction with itself, and use that as the root of the tree. It still returned the same error.
In the litecoin coinbase transaction, the 44-byte merge mining part (fabe + "mm") is preceded by the length (44, or 2c) in some examples, but not in others. Apparently, this length is not necessary if the merge mining string is provided within the first 20 characters of the script, so I left it out in this example. However, in previous iterations, I added an additional byte of "2c" before the merge mining portion and it did not result in any difference in this error.
In these examples, I always assumed that the merkle branches are double-sha256 hashes, even for scrypt coins. All the documentation I read seems to indicate that in scrypt, the only difference is the algorithm used to verify work. From what I can tell, the rest of the block still is stored using SHA-256 hashes, as is the hash of the block headers and even the hashes of the transactions. If there is some difference between scrypt and SHA-256 in how the merge mining headers are stored, that could be a clue.
Thanks to anyone who is willing to try to point out what is wrong here. We have about 15 features ready for release and merge mining is the only one that is holding back the release. Your help is greatly appreciated.
NOTE: This standard is used by Namecoin, but new merged mining data should likely propose a new BIP to supercede it with something based on p2pool's merged mining. Contents. 1 Terminology; 2 Aux proof-of-work block; 3 Merkle Branch; 4 Merged mining coinbase; 5 Aux work merkle tree; 6 Example; 7 Notes; Terminology Auxiliary Proof-of-Work (POW) a.k.a "AuxPOW". This is the way that merged mining ... Namecoin is one of the oldest altcoins, which are currencies offered as an alternative to Bitcoin.. The developers of Namecoin took a very novel approach when creating their currency, tying it to the Bitcoin blockchain, which allows Namecoin to be mined simultaneously with Bitcoin, and using the currency as an alternative DNS (Domain Name Server) system. Namecoin, effectively a decentralized domain registry, was the first coin to have merged mining with Bitcoin. Once a top 10 cryptocurrency by market cap, it’s dropped significantly to a spot in the high 200s. It serves as a great example of how a project can slowly fall by the wayside – even when tied to cryptocurrency’s most powerful network. Merged mining allows miners to borrow their hash power to these weaker cryptocurrencies. With this process, also known as Auxiliary Proof-of-Work, both cryptocurrencies can at the same time enjoy the benefits of having their hash rate increased, benefits which include the increased security.This method was first used by Namecoin in 2011, with Bitcoin as the parent cryptocurrency. Over the past few months, merged mining has become a rather hot topic of conversation. Dogecoin can now be merge mined with Litecoin, and merged mining is also at the core of the sidechains proposal for Bitcoin currently under production from Adam Back and Austin Hill. Namecoin was one of the first major cryptocurrencies to benefit from merged ...
Namecoin Mining What is Namecoin? Cryptocurrency By DailyDot
In this episode of BitNews: - Merged Litecoin and Dogecoin Mining Effects TODAY at 9AM PST! - EXCLUSIVE: Multipool Launches A NEW Merged Mining Pool For LTC + Doge + PTC + ULTC Like us on Facebook ... As the world is moving towards the global part of the world the world has to know the concept of the cryptocurrency as namecoin, bitcoin, litecoin, laxmicoin, etc. Important concepts are held at ... This video is unavailable. Watch Queue Queue. Watch Queue Queue Use any CPU or GPU for any coin, SHA-256 or Scrypt, any computer, as many computers, and with immediate mining results. https://www.eobot.com/new.aspx?referi... Buy Anything On Amazon? Feel Free To Support Me Through This Link! - https://geni.us/ILoMw Litecoin Block Reward Halving Countdown - https://www.litecoinbloc...